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The European Law Blog will be taking a summer recess. We’ll be back end of August with new 
commentaries, including on key Summer developments. Please do send us on your 
contributions throughout this period and we will get back to you in due course. Happy Holidays 
to all our readers! 
By Valentin Vandendaele 
Lawyers, engineers, architects, and other liberal professions, i.e. ‘occupations requiring special 
training in the liberal arts or sciences’, tend to be subject to heavy regulation. Such regulation 
may preserve a high service quality or shield consumers against malpractice (see the European 
Commission’s Report on Competition in Professional Services (COM(2004) 83 final, paras 1 
and 28). In a similar vein, Member States have adopted legislation setting minimum and 
maximum prices in an attempt to ensure service quality by preventing excessive competition 
on price or to protect consumers from excessive prices. 
One example of such legislation is the German Honorarordnung für Architekten und 
Ingenieure, which was the matter of contention in the Commission v Germany case (C-377/17). 
This decree fixed minimum and maximum tariffs architects and engineers could charge for 
their planning services. In its judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court) 
ruled that these tariffs constituted requirements falling within the scope of Article 15(2)(g) of 
the Services Directive (2006/123/EC). This was true even though the German measure 
provided for multiple exceptions allowing the legal minimum and maximum tariffs to be 
disregarded. Advocate General (AG) Szpunar had more openly suggested that these exceptions 
were inconsequential under Article 15(2)(g). Finally, the Court held that the German tariff 
regulation did not satisfy the conditions in Article 15(3) to be compatible with the directive. 
Legal Background 
Article 15 is part of Chapter III of the Services Directive on the freedom of establishment. 
Article 15(2) specifically lists a number of non-discriminatory requirements Member States 
may impose on service providers, like minimum and/or maximum tariffs (Article 15(2)(g)). To 
be compatible with the directive, these requirements must fulfil the conditions of Article 15(3) 
(Article 15(1)). More precisely, they must not directly or indirectly discriminate on the basis 
of nationality or, with respect to companies, the location of the registered office (Article 
15(3)(a)), they must be justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest (Article 
15(3)(b)), and they must be proportionate to this objective, i.e. they must be suitable to attain 
the objective, they must not go beyond what is necessary to do so, and there must be no less 
restrictive alternative that would attain the same result (Article 15(3)(c)). 
In the Commission v Germany case, the question arose whether Germany’s tariff regulation 
could be compatible with the Services Directive if it contained a sufficient number of 
exceptions. This question echoes the “flexibility exemption” introduced in the Commission v 
Italy judgment (C-565/08). In this judgment, the Court held that Italian regulation setting a cap 
on lawyer tariffs was not proven to adversely affect market access ‘under conditions of normal 
and effective competition’. Rather, the maximum-tariff mechanism was ‘characterised by a 
flexibility which appears to allow proper remuneration for all types of services provided by 
lawyers’. To support this assertion, the Court referred to the exceptions in the regulation 
permitting lawyers to charge tariffs exceeding the standard legal maximum. In conclusion, the 
Italian measure did not restrict the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services 
under the predecessors of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU (Commission v Italy, paras 53-54). 
The AG’s Opinion 
AG Szpunar’s assessment of the German tariff regulation’s restrictive effect took the form of 
a simple modus ponens: (1) if a measure satisfies the conditions of Article 15(2) of the Services 
Directive, then it constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment, and (2) the German 
measure imposing minimum and maximum tariffs satisfied these conditions, so (3) the measure 
was restrictive (paras 36-38). The AG explicitly added that the German regulation was 
restrictive even in light of the Court’s judgment in the Commission v Italy case, for two reasons. 
First, the Italian regulation under dispute in that case was far more flexible than the contentious 
German provisions. Second, Article 15(2)(g) defines fixed minimum and maximum tariffs as 
restrictions and removes the need to evaluate their restrictive effect any further (paras 44-50). 
According to AG Szpunar, moreover, Germany had not proved its tariff regulation to be 
justified under Article 15(3) of the Services Directive (paras 80 and further). The AG thus 
advised the Court to declare that Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 
15(1), (2)(g), and (3) of the directive (para 113). 
The Court’s Judgment 
The Court concurred that the German requirements came within the purview of Article 15(2)(g) 
of the Services Directive because they fixed minimum and maximum tariffs for planning 
services provided by architects and engineers (para 66). This reason appeared to be sufficient 
for the directive provision to apply. The Court thus seemed to agree with AG Szpunar, albeit 
implicitly, that there was no room for a flexibility exemption under Article 15(2)(g). 
The Court also thought Germany had not demonstrated that its requirements satisfied the 
conditions under Article 15(3) of the directive. Admittedly, the German regulation was not 
discriminatory (para 68, first condition). In addition, Germany had invoked multiple grounds 
of justification that could constitute overriding reasons relating to the public interest or be 
subsumed under such reasons (paras 69-72, second condition). Yet the Court found that 
Germany’s requirements were not proven to be proportionate to these objectives (paras 75-95, 
third condition). The Court therefore reached the conclusion that Germany had infringed 
Article 15(1), (2)(g), and (3) of the Services Directive (para 96). 
Comment 
Flexibility and Article 15(2) of the Services Directive 
Apparently, the analysis under Article 15(2)(g) of the Services Directive does not include a 
flexibility exemption. This result is consistent with the Court’s pre-existing case law on Article 
15(2). Indeed, it follows from this case law that Article 15(2) catches measures as soon as they 
correspond to requirements as listed in the same provision. The Hiebler (C-293/14), X and 
Visser (C-360/15 and C-31/16), and CMVRO (C-297/16) judgments to which AG Szpunar 
referred (para 36) corroborate this statement. More recently, the Court even applied the same 
reasoning to maximum tariffs in the Repsol Butano case (C-473/17 and C-546/17). 
Flexibility and Article 15(3) of the Services Directive 
Be that as it may, the exceptions for which tariff regulation provides may yet be relevant to the 
proportionality test under Article 15(3)(c) of the Services Directive. This is because tariff 
regulation may in fact be less restrictive if it contains exceptions. They may, for instance, allow 
service providers to charge properly remunerative or more competitive tariffs. In the presence 
of many or important exceptions, it may therefore be easier to argue that tariff regulation is 
necessary, i.e. the regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve its legitimate 
purpose and no less restrictive alternative that would attain the same result exists. 
Neither the AG’s opinion nor the Court’s judgment in the Commission v Germany case 
supports this proposition, but the Court’s judgment in the DKV Belgium case (C-577/11) might. 
This case concerned Belgian legislation limiting how often and how much insurance premium 
rates could increase. The measure was supposed to protect consumers, ‘particularly with a view 
to preventing them from being faced with sharp, unexpected increases in insurance premium 
rates’. The Court found a measure such as the Belgian one to be restrictive within the meaning 
of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU yet suitable to attain the objective of consumer protection, which 
is an overriding requirement relating to the public interest (paras 34-42). 
The next question was whether a measure like the one at issue went beyond what was necessary 
to attain this objective. The Court gave a threefold argument in favour of such a measure: (1) 
it protected older consumers who are more likely to rely on the insurance from sharp and 
unexpected premium rate increases that could make the insurance unaffordable for them, (2) it 
did not prevent insurers from freely setting the initial premium level, and (3) the responsible 
administrative body could allow an insurer ‘to take measures in order to balance its premium 
rates where they risk giving rise to losses’ (paras 44-46). Conditional upon the national judge 
finding that there was no less restrictive alternative that may achieve the same result, the Court 
concluded, a measure such as that under dispute did not go beyond what was necessary to 
achieve its purpose (para 47). 
The Court’s argumentation demonstrates the potential but also limited relevance of exceptions 
in price regulation to the necessity test. On the one hand, the Court seemed to think the 
exceptions the responsible administrative body could provide made a measure like the one at 
issue in the DKV Belgium case more acceptable. They arguably made such a measure less 
restrictive inasmuch as they could prevent premium rates from giving rise to losses. On the 
other hand, the observation that tariff regulation provides for exceptions and is therefore less 
restrictive may not be sufficient to prove the regulation to be necessary. Indeed, such regulation 
may yet go beyond what is necessary to pursue its legitimate purpose and an (even) less 
restrictive alternative that would attain the same result may still exist. The Court implied as 
much when it concluded that a measure such as the Belgian one in the DKV Belgium case did 
not go beyond what was necessary to achieve its purpose only if the national judge found that 
there was no less restrictive alternative that could achieve the same result. Member States must 
then provide additional arguments to demonstrate that their tariff regulation is necessary. 
Conclusion 
The exceptions tariff regulation may make, seem immaterial when determining whether this 
regulation falls within the scope of Article 15(2)(g) of the Services Directive. Only the 
conditions the directive explicitly mentions seem decisive. However, tariff regulation 
containing exceptions may in fact be less restrictive. In the presence of such exceptions, it may 
then be easier to argue that the regulation is necessary within the meaning of Article 15(3)(c) 
of the directive. 
 
